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The District of Columbia’s Tuition Assistance Grant Program (DCTAG), instituted in 1999, allows
DC residents to attend public colleges and universities throughout the country at considerably lower
in-state tuition rates. We use the sharp decline in the price of public colleges and universities faced
by residents of the District of Columbia under DCTAG to estimate the effects of price on students’
college application and enrollment decisions. Using a sample of students from nearby large cities
as a control group, we find that the number and share of DC residents applying to four-year colleges
increased substantially under the program, and students were considerably more likely to apply to
colleges that were eligible for the subsidy. Freshmen enrollments of DC residents also increased
substantially at eligible institutions, although the effect on overall freshmen enrollments of DC
residents was fairly modest, suggesting that in its first year the subsidy had more of an impact on
where students chose to attend than on whether they chose to attend college at all.
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How college price influences students’ decisions about whether and where to attend is a 
question important to policymakers, university administrators, and education researchers alike, 
but it is difficult to determine how sensitive students’ application and enrollment decisions are to 
the prices they face at various institutions.  The amount of financial aid available to students 
typically is correlated with individual characteristics that may influence their college decisions, 
and the price of individual colleges and universities is correlated with other characteristics of the 
institution, but determining the effect of college costs on students’ decisions requires an 
exogenous source of variation in prices.  In this paper, we utilize one such source of variation, 
the District of Columbia’s Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program, to examine the effect of 
a sharp decline in public college and university prices faced by DC residents on their college 
application and enrollment decisions. 
The DCTAG program, established in 1999, provides a substantial subsidy for DC 
residents to attend public colleges and universities outside the District.  Specifically, the program 
allows qualifying DC residents to attend public colleges and universities in other states at the 
considerably lower “in-state” tuition rates of these institutions.  This benefit is subject to an 
annual cap of $10,000 and a lifetime cap of $50,000 per student. District of Columbia residents 
attending private institutions in the Washington, DC metropolitan area or designated historically 
black private colleges and universities are eligible for a considerably smaller subsidy of $2,500 
per year.   
In this paper, we examine the effect of the DCTAG program on the college application 
and enrollment decisions of DC residents, using students from large cities in nearby states as a 
control group.  In particular, we examine whether there are discernible effects of the DCTAG   2
program on the likelihood that DC residents graduating from high school apply to and actually 
enroll in college or on the kinds of schools that DC high school graduates consider and attend.  
We also draw conclusions regarding the broader question of the effects of financial aid and the 
price of college on students’ college application and enrollment decisions.  
  There is a growing literature that explores the effects of college price on students’ 
enrollment decisions and how these effects differ by socioeconomic status.  While much of the 
earlier literature failed to address the potential endogeneity of college prices faced by particular 
groups of students, several recent studies have convincingly identified the effects of college price 
on college attendance, typically through evaluations of federal, state, or individual university 
policies that have introduced plausibly exogenous changes in the price of college for specific 
groups of students.
 1    
In general, these more recent studies have implemented varied approaches and focused 
on different groups of students, and they have produced a range of estimates of the effect of 
college price on student enrollments.  For instance, Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2002) find 
no statistically discernable effect on enrollments of a change in the amount of aid offered to 
students at a major northeastern university, although they find marginally significant effects for 
minority students.  Van der Klaauw (2002) implements a regression discontinuity design to 
examine the effects of financial aid offers at an east coast college and finds that a 10 percent 
increase in financial aid led to an 8.6 percent increase in the probability of enrollment among 
individuals who also applied for federal financial aid, but only a 1.3 percent increase in this 
probability for those who did not file for federal aid (and presumably were from higher income 
families).   
                                                 
1 See Leslie and Brinkman (1988) for a review of the earlier literature and Dynarski (2002) for an 
excellent overview of the more recent literature.   3
Studies of broader changes in public policy rather than of individual schools’ financial 
aid policies are perhaps more relevant to the study of a large-scale tuition subsidy program such 
as DCTAG.  These studies yield estimates that are similarly variable.  Dynarski (2000) finds that 
Georgia’s HOPE merit-based scholarship program increased college attendance rates among 
middle- and upper-income students by about 4 percentage points for each $1,000 in aid.  
Through an examination of another exogenous source of variation in financial aid, the 
elimination of the Social Security student benefit program, Dynarski (2003) estimates that 
$1,000 of grant aid increases the probability of attending college by 3.2 percentage points among 
children with deceased fathers (a disproportionately low-income population).  Kane (1994) 
examines the effects of within-state changes in public university tuition and finds no statistically 
discernable effect of college price on enrollment of white students, but a significant effect on 
African-American students.  Kane (2003) exploits discontinuities in the need- and merit-based 
Cal Grant financial aid program and finds significant effects on enrollments in the program’s 
first year, but no statistically discernable effects in the program’s second year.  He estimates that 
his first-year results imply enrollment increases of 1.2 to 9.2 percentage points per $1000 of aid, 
depending on the degree of crowd-out from other sources of aid.     
  Our study provides important complementary evidence on the effects of financial aid for 
students of both low and high socioeconomic status.  Unlike most financial aid policies evaluated 
in previous work, DCTAG is neither need-based nor merit-based nor targeted at a specific 
population (such as children of deceased fathers), but is available to all DC residents meeting 
basic eligibility criteria, a group that represents a broad socioeconomic spectrum.  In addition, 
previous studies have focused on college attendance rates and educational attainment.  While we 
too examine college enrollment effects, we also possess a rich dataset containing information on   4
individual students’ background characteristics, SAT scores, and the colleges to which they sent 
these scores, which we interpret as a proxy for where they ultimately apply.  These data allow us 
to examine the effects of financial aid policy and tuition prices on students’ decisions about 
where to apply as well as to enroll, a question of particular interest to university administrators 
who attempt to attract applicants via their aid policies.   
 
2.  Overview of the DCTAG Program  
High school graduates in most states have access to a publicly funded higher education 
system that includes a network of colleges and universities.  The only publicly funded institution 
of higher education in the District of Columbia is the University of the District of Columbia, an 
open-admissions institution that in many respects functions more like a community college than 
a typical university.  Early in 1999, legislation to allow District high school graduates to attend 
public universities nationwide at in-state tuition rates was introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  A more restrictive competing proposal, which would have limited program 
coverage to public institutions in Maryland and Virginia, soon appeared in the Senate.  Those 
favoring tuition subsidy legislation argued that it would help to stem the outflow of middle class 
families, especially those with school age children, from the District and create invaluable 
opportunities for inner city youth.  Given wide bipartisan support for the idea of tuition subsidies 
for DC high school graduates, passage of legislation in some form was widely anticipated. 
The U.S. Congress passed the District of Columbia College Access Act of 1999 into law 
on November 12, 1999, and the first grants awarded under the program were for the 2000–2001 
academic year.  Under the legislation, any recent DC high school graduate who attends an 
eligible public institution may receive a benefit equal to the difference between that school’s in-  5
state tuition and out-of-state tuition rates, up to $10,000 per year and $50,000 over the student’s 
lifetime.  The law originally designated all public institutions located in Maryland and Virginia 
as eligible institutions, and during the fall of 1999, when most graduating high school seniors 
were applying to colleges for the fall of 2000, students would have assumed that the DCTAG 
program would benefit only those attending Maryland or Virginia schools.  But the law also 
allowed the Mayor of the District of Columbia to broaden the program’s scope if he or she 
determined that eligible students were experiencing difficulty in gaining admission to public 
colleges in Maryland and Virginia.  In May 2000, the mayor took this step and formally extended 
the program to include all public institutions of higher education nationwide.   
In addition to the subsidies provided for students attending public colleges and 
universities, the law also provided smaller tuition subsidies for students attending private 
nonprofit colleges or universities located in the District of Columbia metropolitan area or private 
historically black colleges and universities located in Maryland and Virginia.
2  Private school 
grants are subject to a maximum of $2,500 per year and $12,500 over a student’s lifetime.  
To be eligible for benefits under the program, a student must have been a resident of the 
District of Columbia for at least 12 consecutive months prior to beginning his or her freshman 
year of college; have graduated from high school or received a GED on or after January 1, 1998; 
have begun an undergraduate course of study within three years of high school graduation or 
receipt of the GED (extended for periods of military or Peace Corps service); be enrolled at least 
half-time in a course of study leading to an accredited degree; and not already hold a bachelor’s 
                                                 
2 Schools on the original list of eligible private institutions include American University, Catholic 
University, the Corcoran School of Art, Gallaudet University, George Washington University, 
Georgetown University, Howard University, Southeastern University, Trinity College, Capitol College, 
Columbia Union College, Maryland College of Art and Design, Washington Adventist Hospital School of 
Radiology, Washington Bible College, Hampton University, Marymount University, Saint Paul’s College 
and Virginia Union University.  The private school program recently was expanded, effective for the 
2002–2003 school year, to cover historically black colleges and universities nationwide.   6
degree.  In 2002 the eligibility requirements were liberalized to allow older high school 
graduates to benefit from the program.  The DCTAG program is not means tested; indeed, those 
who apply are not required to provide any information about their family’s income or assets.   
Benefits may be applied only to tuition and fees, and benefit grants are to be made 
directly to the eligible institution, which must agree to comply with the program’s administrative 
requirements.  If federal funding for the program is ever insufficient to meet all requests for 
assistance, the mayor of DC is authorized to allocate payments based on the income and need of 
eligible students.  To date, however, funding for the program has greatly exceeded the demand 
for funds, and this is projected to remain true for the foreseeable future.  In the DCTAG 
program’s first year, 1,900 individuals used the grant to attend 152 participating institutions 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002).
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3.  Data and Estimation Strategy 
A.  SAT Dataset 
 
In our study of the effects of DCTAG on students’ college decisions, we analyze data 
from two sources.  To examine the college application decisions of individual students affected 
by the DCTAG program, we use data from the College Board containing information on high 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting two other programs that are available to assist DC residents in applying to and 
financing college, although both are on a considerably smaller scale than DCTAG.  The District of 
Columbia College Access Program (DC CAP) provides support services to DC public high school 
students and to DC public high school graduates for up to five years following graduation, to help them 
complete their college education.  Advisors located on-site at DC public high schools provide individual 
and group counseling, college application assistance, and help with accessing financial aid.  DC CAP was 
launched as a pilot program in selected schools during the 1999-2000 academic year and since then has 
been expanded to all DC public high schools.  DC CAP also provides need-based “last dollar” award 
scholarships of up to $2,000 to cover costs of college attendance not covered by other financial assistance 
programs.  Any DC public high school student is eligible to apply.  The Leveraging Educational 
Assistance Partnership (LEAP) program grants undergraduate study awards of up to $1,000 per year to 
qualifying DC residents.  These need-based awards may be used at any post-secondary institution in the 
country.  This financial assistance program has been in existence for a number of years.  
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school students who took the SAT.  Data cover the 1994 through 2001 cohorts, where a cohort is 
defined as the group of students who on a normal schedule would graduate from high school in 
the indicated year.  The database includes all black and Hispanic test takers, all test takers 
residing in Washington DC, and a 25 percent random sample of non-black, non-Hispanic test 
takers in other states.  Most of the variables included in the database were derived from 
information supplied by the test takers on the Student Descriptive Questionnaire.  Variables 
pertaining to the individual test takers that we use in our analysis include colleges to which test 
scores were sent (4-digit code, up to 20 recorded in 1994–1998, up to 30 recorded in 1999–
2001), state of residence, high school attended, type of high school attended (public, private, or 
other), race/ethnicity, highest level of education attained by mother and by father, and SAT math 
and verbal scores.   
To estimate the effects of DCTAG on District students’ college application decisions, we 
pursue a difference-in-differences approach, using students from large cities in nearby states 
(Baltimore, Maryland; Newark, New Jersey; Norfolk, Virginia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) 
as a control group.  To select these cities, we first identified nearby states with SAT-taking rates 
similar to DC’s.  We then selected cities from these states with populations of 200,000 or more 
with a high proportion of African-Americans (40 percent of the population or more), based on 
2000 Census data as reported in U.S. Census Bureau (2001).
 4  (DC has a population of 572,059 
and is 60 percent African-American.)  None of the states in which the control cities are located 
instituted a college assistance program on anything like the scale of DCTAG over the period of 
interest.  As the SAT dataset has information on students’ state of residence and school (which 
can be matched to school address information), we identify SAT-takers by city based on their 
                                                 
4 We also conducted the analysis with all test-takers from Maryland, North Carolina, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, New Jersey, and Connecticut as a control group, as well as with different sets of 
cities as a control group.  The results are very similar and are available from the authors upon request.     8
state of residence and their attendance at a high school located in the relevant city.  We also 
include DC residents attending high schools located in Maryland and Virginia, as many DC 
residents attend suburban private schools in these states (discussed in more detail below). 
Throughout our analysis, we exclude students without a valid SAT score and students 
who did not send their score to at least one four-year college or university.   For consistency 
across years, we also exclude students who did not report an ethnicity (these students were 
missing from the 1994–98 samples provided by the College Board).  Because we use high school 
address to match students to cities, students not reporting a valid high school code or students 
reporting a high school code that could not be matched to an address are excluded as well.  Our 
results are not sensitive to any of these exclusions.     
We treat a student’s decision to have SAT scores sent to a college or university as a 
proxy for the decision to apply to that institution.
5  We expect that most four-year-college-bound 
high school seniors in DC and the other cities in our analysis will take the SAT and will send 
their SAT scores to every four-year college or university to which they apply.
6  As most 
community colleges and other two-year colleges do not require SAT scores for admission, we 
limit our analysis of the SAT data to students applying to four-year colleges and universities.   
                                                 
5 Of course, sending SAT scores to a particular college is not a perfect proxy for actually applying to that 
college — students may send their scores to colleges to which they ultimately decide not to apply, and 
they may apply to colleges to which they do not send their SAT scores (for instance, if the college does 
not require SAT scores for admission).  The ideal dataset for assessing the use of sending SAT scores as a 
proxy for applying to a college would contain individual-level information on both.  Unfortunately, we 
know of no such dataset.  Card and Krueger (2003) tackle this question using data for public universities 
in the state of California disaggregated by race/ethnicity and campus.  They show that information on the 
number of students of a given race/ethnicity who send their SAT scores to particular campuses proxies 
very well for the number of students of a given race/ethnicity who actually apply to those same campuses.   
6 Almost all colleges and universities accept scores from either the SAT or ACT (formerly the American 
College Test) for admission.  The vast majority of college-bound high school students in DC and the 
other states represented in our analysis take the SAT, however, while only a small fraction of students in 
each of these states takes the ACT.  See Clark (2003) for more information on SAT- and ACT-taking 
rates across states.     9
  To examine how DCTAG affected students’ college application decisions, we estimate 





ijt o ijt t t ijt
t
YX β βα δ ε
=
=+ + + ∑     (1) 
 
In this model, Yiit can represent various indicators of the DCTAG program’s effects — for 
instance, whether student i graduating from high school in year t sent SAT scores to any 
DCTAG-eligible Maryland or Virginia institution, whether the student sent scores to any 
DCTAG-eligible public institution anywhere in the U.S., or the number or fraction of scores that 
the student sent to eligible institutions.  Xijt is a vector of individual-level characteristics that are 
likely to be correlated with college application decisions, including race, parental education, and 
type of high school (public, private, or other) that the student attends.  εijt is a stochastic error 
term.   
The sequence αt is a set of year dummy variables, defined in the following way:  α1995 
equals one if the year in which the student is expected to graduate from high school is 1995 or 
later and zero otherwise, α1996 equals one if the student is expected to graduate in 1996 or later 
and zero otherwise, and so forth, for years t = 1995 through 2001.  Defined in this way, the 
coefficients on the year dummies represent the average change in the dependent variable 
(conditional on covariates Xijt) between year t and year t-1.  For instance, consider the model in 
which the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the student applied to an eligible school 
in Maryland or Virginia.  If the DCTAG program had a positive impact on the likelihood that a 
student applied to a DCTAG-eligible college in Maryland or Virginia, we would expect to see 
this reflected in a positive, significant coefficient on α2000, which represents the change in the  10
probability that a DC student applied to an eligible college in Maryland or Virginia between 
1999 and 2000, the first year that the program was available.  With lags in response to the 
introduction of the program, we might also expect a positive, significant coefficient on α2001, 
which represents any change in the same probability between 2000 and 2001. 
  It is of course possible that factors other than the DCTAG program were driving changes 
in the college application decisions of DC residents over this period.  To control for such 
potentially confounding factors, we use students from nearby large cities as a control group and 
estimate a model for the full sample that interacts the year dummies with an indicator for 
whether the student is a resident of DC or some other city:      
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In this model, Yijt is the outcome variable of interest for student i in city j graduating from 
high school in year t.  As above, Xijt is a vector of individual-level characteristics, αt represents a 
set of year dummies, defined as described above, µj represents a set of city dummy variables, DC 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the city is DC, zero otherwise, and υijt is a stochastic error 
term.  In this model, the coefficient on the interaction between αt and DC represents the change 
in the dependent variable from year t-1 to year t in DC relative to the control cities.  If DCTAG 
had a positive impact on the likelihood that a student applied to a DCTAG-eligible college in 
Maryland or Virginia, we would expect to see this reflected in positive, significant coefficients 
on α2000  x DC and/or α2001 x DC.  These two coefficients represent the change in the probability 
that a DC student applied to an eligible college in Maryland or Virginia between 1999 and 2000 
and between 2000 and 2001, over and above any change in the probabilities for students in the 
control cities. 
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B.  IPEDS Dataset 
To examine actual college enrollments of students from DC and surrounding states, we 
use data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), a dataset 
maintained by the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education.  
The IPEDS contains data on institutions that grant baccalaureate or higher degrees, institutions 
that award two-year degrees, and less-than-two-year institutions.  The IPEDS database consists 
of institution-level data collected through a set of annual surveys that together provide 
information on a range of items, including tuition and fall enrollments.  In our analysis, we use 
institution-level IPEDS data for two- and four-year institutions from 1996, 1998 and 2000 on fall 
enrollments of freshmen by state of residence and in- and out-of-state tuition rates. 
 
4.  The Effects of DCTAG on College Application and Enrollment Decisions 
A.  DCTAG’s Effect on Applications to Four-Year Colleges  
  One important objective of the DCTAG program is to encourage DC residents who 
would not otherwise have done so to apply to a four-year college or university.  Ideally, we 
would like to examine whether the share of DC high school graduates sending SAT scores to a 
four-year college increased after the program was implemented.  The total number of DC 
residents sending SAT scores to a four-year college did indeed increase, from 1,394 in 1999 to 
1,540 in 2001 (see Table 1, column 1).  But it is difficult to determine whether the share of DC 
students sending scores to four-year institutions increased, as there are no reliable estimates of 
the total number of DC residents graduating from high school in each year.  Private schools 
account for a significant proportion of the high school graduates in the DC metropolitan area, but 
the available data on private high school graduates are collected from the schools, and reporting  12
by state is based on the schools’ locations rather than the student’s state of residence.  Many of 
the students who attend private high schools located in the District, however, are residents of 
Maryland or Virginia, and conversely, some DC residents attend private high schools located 
outside of the District’s boundaries in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs.
 7  There is thus no 
obvious way to determine the number of DC residents graduating from private high schools each 
year.   
In contrast, almost all of the students who graduate from the District’s public high 
schools are DC residents, and data on the number of public high school graduates are readily 
available.  Although the demographics of the public school population differ in some important 
ways from those of the full population of DC high school graduates, the population of public 
high school students is of interest in its own right, so it is useful to examine both the number and 
share of DC’s public high school graduates applying to a four-year college or university.
 8  
Overall, in each year from 1994 through 2001, roughly two-thirds of SAT-takers living in DC 
attended public high schools.  The number of DC public high school graduates taking the SAT 
increased considerably after the implementation of DCTAG, from 957 in 1999 to 1,084 in 2001 
(column 2).  Although the number of students graduating from the District’s public high schools 
also has increased over this period (column 3), the share of District public high school graduates 
                                                 
7 While data on both residence and school location are not available for the full population of DC 
students, tabulations from the SAT database can provide a general sense of high school enrollment 
patterns among SAT-takers.  Only 72 percent of SAT-takers who live in DC and attend a private high 
school attend a school located in the District, with 22 percent attending a Maryland high school and 5 
percent a Virginia high school.  Of the SAT-takers enrolled in private high schools located in the District, 
40 percent are District residents, 42 percent are Maryland residents, and 18 percent are Virginia residents.  
In contrast, 98 percent of SAT-takers who live in DC and attend a public high school attend a school 
located in the District, and 97 percent of those attending a DC public high school are District residents. 
8 In 2000, the most recent year for which the Department of Education has published data on student 
characteristics, 2,695 students graduated from the DC public high schools and 1,231 students graduated 
from private high schools located in the District.  Less than 4 percent of the graduates of the DC public 
high schools were white, non-Hispanic, a share that is far below the share of white, non-Hispanics in the 
DC population of high school age.  Throughout this analysis, we categorize public high school graduates 
separately from charter school graduates.    13
who took the SAT and had their scores sent to at least one four-year college increased 
substantially in 2000 and remained high in 2001 (column 4).  This pattern is quite different from 
that for our comparison cities, in which the share of public high school graduates taking the SAT 
has declined since 1998.
9  This suggests that the DCTAG program encouraged students who 
might not otherwise have done so to apply to a four-year college. 
The DCTAG program also may have affected the types of four-year colleges to which 
DC residents apply, as it makes public colleges and universities located in other jurisdictions 
considerably more affordable.
10  Table 2 presents the results of regression model (1) in order to 
examine whether the proportion of DC SAT-takers sending scores to eligible institutions in 
Maryland or Virginia (columns 1 and 2) or in any state (columns 3 and 4) increased after the 
program was implemented.  In each of these models, the year dummy variable coefficients 
capture the change from one year to the next in the probability that a graduating DC high school 
senior who has taken the SAT sends his or her scores to at least one Maryland or Virginia public 
four-year school or to at least one public four-year school located in any state.  The models 
reported in columns (1) and (3) contain only the year dummy variables; those in columns (2) and 
(4) control for demographic covariates that may be correlated with students’ college application 
decisions, including the type of high school a student attends (public, private, or other, where 
“other” includes charter schools and home schools, and represents less than 1 percent of the 
                                                 
9 The number of high school graduates is based on district-level reports contained in the National Center 
for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data.  City and school district boundaries coincide for each of 
the cities used in the analysis.   
10 As already noted, the DCTAG program also offers a $2,500 subsidy to students who attend selected 
private colleges and universities.  Most of these colleges and universities — particularly those that are 
included because they are located in the DC metropolitan area, rather than because they are historically 
black institutions — are quite expensive, and the DCTAG subsidy is unlikely to make them affordable for 
someone who would have been deterred by their high tuitions in the first place.    14
sample), the student’s race/ethnicity, the level of education obtained by the student’s parents and 
the student’s combined math and verbal SAT score.   
In 1999, 47.8 percent of DC SAT-takers sent their scores to at least one public Maryland 
or Virginia school, and 73.5 percent sent their scores to at least one public institution somewhere 
in the country.  The Table 2 models without controls for demographic characteristics suggest that 
the share of DC SAT-takers who sent their scores to at least one Maryland or Virginia school 
rose by 9.1 percentage points in 2000 and an additional 6.4 percentage points in 2001.  The 
cumulative increase in the share sending their scores to any public institution was somewhat 
smaller — 7.2 percentage points in 2000 plus an additional 6.7 percentage points in 2001.  
Adding controls for demographic characteristics has only a small effect on the coefficients of 
interest. 
  Of course, external factors other than the introduction of the DCTAG program might 
account for the increase in the share of SAT-takers who apply to at least one out-of-own-state 
public four-year college.  In order to control for potentially confounding trends in college 
application behavior, in Table 3 we present results from difference-in-differences model (2), 
using students from Baltimore, Newark, Norfolk, and Philadelphia as a control group.  The year 
dummy variable coefficients in these models capture the effects of any general influence on the 
propensity to apply to out-of-state public institutions.  The coefficients on the interactions 
between the year dummies and the DC dummy represent the effects of anything that is DC-
specific — most notably the DCTAG program — on District students’ application patterns.  The 
coefficients on these interaction variables — both in the models without demographic controls 
and in the models to which those controls have been added — differ only modestly from the year 
dummy coefficients in the simpler models reported in Table 3 and also indicate significant  15
increases in the likelihood that a DC resident who took the SAT sent scores to a DCTAG-eligible 
institution either in Maryland or Virginia or anywhere in the country in both 2000 and 2001.
11   
  An important concern for education policymakers is how tuition subsidy and financial aid 
policies will differentially affect students from different socioeconomic backgrounds.  In Table 4 
we present results from regression model (2) separately for various subgroups.  For ease of 
interpretation, we present only the coefficients on the DC x year interactions, which show the 
change in college application behavior of DC residents relative to their peers in the control cities 
and conditional on the demographic characteristics described above.   
We begin by examining the program’s effects on public versus private high school 
graduates.  For students in the District of Columbia, whether a student attends a public or a 
private high school is highly correlated with family socioeconomic status.  Many DC residents 
who graduate from private high schools expect to attend prestigious private colleges but might 
also consider selected public universities. Interestingly, these students (or their parents) do 
appear to be price sensitive, at least with respect to the set of schools to which they apply.  Over 
the two-year period from 1999 to 2001, the share of college-bound DC private high school 
graduates who sent their test scores to at least one Maryland or Virginia public college rose 19.5 
percentage points, controlling for other factors that might affect college applications.  The 
increase for college-bound DC public high school graduates was somewhat smaller, just 12.7 
percentage points. The gap was even bigger with regard to the share sending at least one 
                                                 
11 In both cases, the dependent variable is defined as 1 if the student applied to an out-of-own-state 
DCTAG-eligible institution in Maryland or Virginia, or nationwide, and zero otherwise.  The former is 
equal to 1 for Maryland residents only if they applied to an eligible institution in Virginia, and for 
Virginia residents only if they applied to an eligible institution in Maryland.  We obtain results that are 
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar when Maryland and Virginia residents are excluded from the 
calculations.  Results are similar in a simpler difference-in-differences model that includes a single 
dummy variable for post-DCTAG in place of the year dummies, and a DC x post-DCTAG interaction 
variable in place of the  
year x DC interactions.    16
application to any public university nationwide: a 20.9 percentage point increase for the private 
high school graduates, as compared to an 8.8 percentage point increase for the public high school 
graduates.  Of course, these results do not necessarily establish that DCTAG had a smaller 
overall effect on public high school students, since the SAT data reflect only students’ 
applications to four-year colleges, whereas DCTAG assistance may help with the costs of 
attending either a two-year or a four-year school. 
A similar pattern emerges for white graduates as compared to black graduates.  The 
coefficients shown in columns (5) and (7) imply that, holding other factors constant, the share of 
college-bound white graduates applying to any Maryland or Virginia public college rose by 20.2 
percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as compared to 14.2 percentage points for black 
graduates.  And the coefficients in columns (6) and (8) imply that, again holding other factors 
constant, the share of white graduates applying to any public college nationwide rose by 23.2 
percentage points, as compared to 10.3 percentage points for blacks. 
The program also appears to have a differential effect on students according to the 
educational attainment of their parents.  Holding other factors constant, among SAT-takers with 
a parent who attended college, the share sending their scores to at least one Maryland or Virginia 
public college rose by 17.6 percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as compared to 8.1 
percentage points for those whose parents completed no education beyond high school.  The 
comparable figures for applications to any public college nationwide are similar: an increase of 
14.9 percentage points for those who had at least one parent who attended college, as compared 
to an increase of 4.5 percentage points for those parents never went beyond high school.  
Interestingly, differences between DC high school graduates with above-average and 
below-average SAT scores are less marked.  In the college-bound group with combined math  17
and verbal scores above 1000, the share who sent at least one application to a public Maryland or 
Virginia school rose 17.1 percentage points between 1999 and 2001, as compared to an increase 
of 13.8 percentage points among those with combined scores of 1000 or less.  Similarly, the 
share applying to at least one public college nationwide rose 16.6 percentage points among those 
with combined scores above 1000, as compared to 9.6 percentage points among those with lower 
combined scores. 
An alternative to looking at whether a student applies to at least one public institution, as 
we have in the previous models, is to look at how many and what share of a student’s 
applications go to such institutions.  This information is shown in Table 5, in which we present 
results of regression model (2) with number of scores (columns 1–3) or share of scores (columns 
4 and 5) each individual sent to various types of institutions as the dependent variable.  All 
models include city-of-residence dummies and demographic covariates; as in Table 4, we present 
only the coefficients on the DC x year interactions.  As shown in column (1), while the average 
number of Maryland or Virginia DCTAG-eligible institutions to which DC residents sent scores 
has been somewhat variable over the years relative to the control group, the greatest increase in 
the number of these institutions to which DC residents sent scores occurred in the years 
following DCTAG’s implementation.  Between 1999 and 2001, the average number of scores 
DC residents sent to these schools increased by 0.41, all else equal.  The average number of 
DCTAG-eligible schools to which DC residents sent scores increased by 0.64 between 1999 and 
2001, as shown in column (2).  The average number of four-year institutions to which DC 
residents sent scores (column 3) also increased, by 0.25 between 1999 and 2001.  Columns (5) 
and (6) indicate that the average fraction of scores DC residents sent to eligible institutions 
increased between 1999 and 2001. Taken together, these results suggest that DCTAG induced  18
some DC residents to apply to more institutions than they would have in the absence of the 
program and also shifted the composition of the institutions to which DC residents were applying 
towards those eligible for the DCTAG program.   
 
B.  DCTAG’s Effect on College Enrollment  
One of the ultimate goals of the DCTAG program is to increase college enrollments of 
DC residents.  All of the data we have examined thus far relate to the decision to apply to a 
(four-year) college or university, proxied for by the decision to send SAT scores.  In this section 
we examine data on college enrollments from the IPEDS database.  In particular, we focus on the 
number of DC residents who graduated from high school in the previous twelve months who are 
enrolled as first-time college freshmen in fall 1996, fall 1998 or fall 2000.
12  The IPEDS data 
provide an important complement to the SAT data, as they allow us to examine where DC 
residents actually choose to enroll after the introduction of DCTAG, including enrollments at 
both two- and four-year colleges. 
Tabulations based on the IPEDS data are reported in Table 6.  We report enrollments for 
1996, 1998, and 2000 for the 15 schools that had the largest increases in enrollment of DC 
residents and the 15 schools that had the largest declines in enrollment of DC residents between 
1998 and 2000. The two schools that appear to have benefited most from the introduction of the 
DCTAG program are Virginia State University, which saw its enrollment of DC freshmen jump 
by 92 students between 1998 and 2000, and Norfolk State University, which experienced an 
enrollment increase of 48 students.  Both are historically black public institutions that appear 
previously to have enrolled relatively few students from the District of Columbia.  Overall, 12 of 
                                                 
12 The IPEDS has information on both total freshmen enrollment and enrollment of freshmen who 
graduated from high school in the past twelve months.  We focus on the latter, as at least initially, only 
recent high school graduates were eligible for the DCTAG program.  19
the 15 colleges and universities that increased their enrollment of DC freshmen by 9 or more 
students between 1998 and 2000 were DCTAG-eligible institutions.   
While some schools appear to have gained significantly from the introduction of the 
DCTAG program, others appear to have lost.  Five of the fifteen schools with the greatest 
declines in enrollment of DC residents are located in the District, suggesting that to some extent 
DC residents who would otherwise have attended college there instead opted to use the DCTAG 
assistance to attend schools outside the District.  Enrollments of DC freshmen declined by 15 
students at the University of the District of Columbia (UDC), the District’s only public 
university, following the introduction of the DCTAG program.
13  Enrollments of DC freshmen 
also dropped at a number of Washington-area private schools at which students were eligible for 
the smaller $2,500 tuition break provided under the DCTAG program, including Georgetown 
University (enrollment of DC residents down by 8 students), George Washington University (37 
students), and Howard University (57 students).  At the latter two schools, the enrollment 
declines appear to be the continuation of a trend begun prior to the introduction of DCTAG.  It 
seems clear that the size of the tuition break offered to students enrolling at these institutions was 
not large enough to have a significant positive effect on their attendance decisions, at least not 
relative to the larger tuition break available to students attending nearby public universities. 
In total, college enrollments of DC residents who graduated from high school in the 
previous twelve months increased enormously between 1998 and 2000 at DCTAG-eligible 
institutions in Maryland and Virginia, jumping by 292 students, an increase of 164 percent from 
the 1998 base of 178 students.  Enrollments of DC freshmen at all DCTAG-eligible institutions 
                                                 
13 The UDC data on enrollment of recent high school graduates as freshmen contained in the IPEDS were 
obviously in error (decreasing from 1,440 in 1994 to 568 in 1996 to 229 in 1998 to 217 in 2000).  Rather 
than using these data, we instead report corrected data that we obtained directly from UDC’s Office of 
University Statistics.    20
(including those in Maryland and Virginia) rose by less, a total of 231 students, suggesting that 
some of the increase at Maryland and Virginia schools was siphoned away from public 
institutions in other states.  This is as we might expect, given that at the time most students 
planning to enter college in fall of 2000 were applying to schools, only public institutions in 
Maryland and Virginia were known to be eligible for the subsidy.   
The program also seems to have successfully met its goal of increasing overall 
enrollments of DC freshmen, rather than simply shifting students from non-eligible to eligible 
schools.  Overall enrollments of DC freshmen graduating from high school in the previous 
twelve months increased by 118 students, or 6.6 percent, between 1998 and 2000.  This increase 
is about 12 percent of the approximately 950 students coming directly from high school who 
used the grant in its first year (U.S.General Accounting Office, 2002).  Although we do not have 
a precise estimate of the total number of DC high school graduates in those years, data from 
Table 1 indicate that the number of public high school graduates declined from 2,777 to 2,695 
between 1998 and 2000.  Assuming that the number of private high school graduates remained 
roughly constant over this period, our estimates from the IPEDS data suggest that an increasing 
number of DC residents were enrolling in college, even while the number of high school 
graduates was declining.   
Table 7 displays in-state and out-of-state 1998 tuition charges at the 15 schools with the 
largest freshmen enrollment increases, and the 15 with the largest freshmen enrollment declines, 
of DC residents.  The differences between out-of-state and in-state tuitions at the eligible schools 
experiencing the largest increases in DC enrollments were substantial, ranging from $1,692 at 
Montgomery College of Rockville to $12,482 at University of Colorado at Boulder.  Taking a 
simple average of these tuition differences across all eligible public colleges and universities,  21
with an adjustment to account for the annual benefit cap of $10,000, the average potential tuition 
savings available to a DCTAG recipient attending an eligible Maryland or Virginia school was 
$3,845; the average potential savings was $3,426 for those attending any DCTAG-eligible school 
nationwide. 
 
C.  Comparison with Other Estimates of the Effect of College Price on Enrollment 
 
For comparison with the literature, it is useful to calculate the effect on the college 
attendance rate of $1,000 of aid.  For instance, Dynarski (2000) estimates that $1,000 under the 
Georgia HOPE Scholarship program increased the college attendance rate at eligible schools in 
Georgia by about 4 percentage points.  If we assume that the number of 17-year olds residing in 
DC remained roughly constant between 1998 and 2000 at 5,860 (as tabulated from the 2000 
Census), then total freshmen enrollment of DC residents increased by 118/5,860 = 2.0 percentage 
points between 1998 and 2000.  (This estimate is somewhat conservative —the decline in the 
number of public high school graduates suggests that the number of 17-year olds actually may 
have fallen over the period.)  If we suppose that DC residents might consider attending any 
school in the country, their average potential tuition savings under the DCTAG program was 
$1,755.
14  We can then roughly calculate that total college attendance of DC residents increased 
by 1.1 percentage points for each $1,000 of tuition assistance.   
This estimate, although rough, is at the low end of estimates in the literature, which range 
from 1.2 percentage points to 9.2 percentage points per $1000 of aid.  Because the IPEDS data 
are available only through the fall of 2000, however, we may not be observing the full long-term 
                                                 
14 As displayed in Table 7, the average difference between out-of-state and in-state tuition across all 
schools represented in the IPEDS tuition survey, including both schools eligible for the DCTAG subsidy 
and schools that are not eligible, is $1,765.  In calculating the average value of the subsidy, however, we 
must account for the fact that the DCTAG benefit is capped at $10,000 per year, which implies an average 
tuition savings of  $1,755.  22
effects of the DCTAG program.  Over the next few years, as current program participants’ 
experiences with the program are shared with friends and relatives, it may gain in popularity and 
its effects on college enrollments may grow.  Indeed, our analysis of college applications 
suggests that applications to eligible schools continued to increase between 2000 and 2001.     
  
5. Conclusions 
The DCTAG program provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of a large, 
exogenous change in tuition price on students’ college decisions.  We examine the program’s 
effects on students’ decisions about where to apply to college and where to enroll.  We find that 
students were cost-sensitive in both their application and enrollment decisions.  The introduction 
of the DCTAG program was accompanied by an increase in the share of DC public high school 
graduates taking the SAT even while the share of public high school graduates in a set of 
comparison cities taking the SAT was declining.  Although we are not able to calculate the share 
of private high school graduates taking the SAT, the number of private high school graduates 
taking the SAT increased over this period as well.   
Among DC high school graduates who took the SAT, the share sending their scores to at 
least one public college or university rose significantly, as did the share of all test scores sent out 
by DC high school graduates going to such schools.  We interpret this as strong evidence that the 
DCTAG program affected college application patterns.  We also find that the DCTAG program 
had a considerably larger effect on the propensity to apply to an eligible four-year college for 
students from more advantaged backgrounds — for students attending a private high school than 
for those attending a public one, for white students than for black students, for students with a  23
parent that attended college than for those whose parents did not, and (to a lesser degree) for 
students scoring higher on the SAT than for those scoring lower on the exam.   
The IPEDS data provide evidence that the program had an impact, not only on 
applications, but also on the pattern of college enrollments among DC residents.  Freshmen 
enrollments of DC residents at eligible Maryland and Virginia schools increased by 164 percent 
between 1998 and 2000, and by 47 percent at eligible schools throughout the country.  Total 
enrollments increased by a more moderate 6.6 percent, suggesting that the program had a weaker 
effect on whether a student decided to attend college than on where they decided to attend.  
Overall, the percentage of DC residents of high -school-graduation age enrolled as freshmen 
increased by only 2 percentage points, or 1.14 percentage points for every $1,000 of aid, between 
1998 and 2000, the first year the subsidy was available.  Data from subsequent years may reveal 
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Schools Schools
SAT Takers SAT Takers Graduates Ratio SAT Takers SAT Takers Graduates Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 
1994 1,481 992 3,207 0.309 9,974 6,086 -- --
1995 1,520 1,060 2,974 0.356 9,993 6,263 -- --
1996 1,448 979 2,696 0.363 10,350 6,493 -- --
1997 1,451 990 2,853 0.347 10,437 6,561 -- --
1998 1,481 1,011 2,777 0.364 10,805 6,833 15,702 0.435
1999 1,394 957 2,675 0.358 10,348 6,583 16,365 0.402
2000 1,543 1,075 2,695 0.399 9,831 6,145 16,546 0.371
2001 1,540 1,084 2,808 0.386 9,917 6,292 16,695 0.377
Source:  National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data, various years, and SAT Score Database.  
Notes:  Number of SAT takers is an actual number for DC and a weighted estimate for the comparison cities (Baltimore, 
    Newark, Norfolk, and Philadelphia).  Number of public high school graduates is based on district-level data from the 
    Common Core of Data as reported by public school districts in the relevant cities.  Each city contains only one regular 
    public school district.  Data on high school graduates from comparison cities are not available for 1994-1997.
Table 1 
Number of SAT Takers as Compared to Number of High School Graduates
Public High Schools Public High Schools
District of Columbia Comparison Cities(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.523 0.612 0.777 0.784
(0.013) (0.031) (0.011) (0.028)
Change 1994-95 -0.041 -0.038 -0.003 -0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Change 1995-96 0.005 0.011 -0.017 -0.013
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Change 1996-97 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Change 1997-98 0.035 0.024 0.024 0.016
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Change 1998-99 -0.045 -0.046 -0.042 -0.041
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Change 1999-2000 0.091 0.090 0.072 0.072
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Change 2000-2001 0.064 0.058 0.067 0.061
(0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Black (yes = 1) 0.176 0.170
(0.015) (0.015)
Hispanic (yes = 1) 0.084 -0.017
(0.025) (0.024)
Other race (yes = 1) 0.140 0.093
(0.020) (0.019)
Parents college (yes = 1) -0.036 0.003
(0.011) (0.008)
Private high school (yes = 1) -0.021 -0.042
(0.012) (0.010)
Other high school (yes = 1) -0.021 -0.056
(0.045) (0.034)
SAT V+M Score/100 -0.022 -0.014
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 11,858 11,858 11,858 11,858
R-squared 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08
Source:  SAT Score Database.  
Notes:  All models weighted OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
     standard errors.
Table 2
MD or VA School School in Any State
Determinants of Whether Students' SAT Scores Sent to at Least
One Out-of-State Public 4-Year College or University; DC Sample Only(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.523 0.285 0.777 0.369
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017)
Change 1994-95 -0.019 -0.019 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Change 1995-96 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Change 1996-97 -0.008 -0.009 -0.016 -0.018
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Change 1997-98 -0.005 -0.003 0.010 0.014
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Change 1998-99 -0.008 -0.010 -0.025 -0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Change 1999-2000 -0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Change 2000-2001 0.008 0.005 0.012 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
DC*Change 1994-95 -0.022 -0.020 -0.007 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
DC*Change 1995-96 -0.014 -0.016 -0.029 -0.031
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
DC*Change 1996-97 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
DC*Change 1997-98 0.041 0.039 0.014 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
DC*Change 1998-99 -0.037 -0.036 -0.017 -0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
DC*Change 1999-2000 0.092 0.097 0.060 0.068
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
DC*Change 2000-2001 0.056 0.057 0.055 0.057
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
State dummies yes yes yes yes
Demographic covariates no yes no yes
Observations 62,415 62,415 62,415 62,415
R-squared 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.14
Source:  SAT Score Database.  
Notes:  All models weighted OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
     standard errors.
Table 3
Difference-in-Difference Model
MD or VA School School in Any State
Determinants of Whether Students' SAT Scores Sent to at Least
One Out-of-State Public 4-Year College or University;MD/VA Any MD/VA Any MD/VA Any MD/VA Any
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.326 0.402 0.194 0.322 0.023 0.208 0.505 0.643
(0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.017) (0.015)
DC*Change 1994-95 -0.001 0.006 -0.069 -0.033 -0.018 -0.045 -0.007 0.018
(0.023) (0.021) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040) (0.047) (0.023) (0.019)
DC*Change 1995-96 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.049 -0.023 -0.060 -0.009 -0.021
(0.023) (0.021) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.047) (0.023) (0.020)
DC*Change 1996-97 0.025 0.027 -0.026 -0.011 -0.001 0.050 0.007 0.010
(0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.046) (0.024) (0.020)
DC*Change 1997-98 0.002 -0.009 0.120 0.062 0.079 0.009 0.023 0.007
(0.023) (0.021) (0.034) (0.036) (0.041) (0.047) (0.024) (0.020)
DC*Change 1998-99 0.002 0.013 -0.125 -0.093 -0.081 -0.063 -0.014 -0.017
(0.024) (0.021) (0.035) (0.037) (0.044) (0.050) (0.024) (0.020)
DC*Change 1999-2000 0.091 0.046 0.098 0.110 0.053 0.069 0.088 0.059
(0.023) (0.020) (0.035) (0.038) (0.043) (0.050) (0.023) (0.020)
DC*Change 2000-2001 0.036 0.042 0.097 0.099 0.149 0.163 0.054 0.044
(0.022) (0.018) (0.037) (0.036) (0.045) (0.047) (0.022) (0.017)
Year change dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 46,972 46,972 15,178 15,178 10,458 10,458 44,245 44,245
R-squared 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.11
(Continued on next page.)
Table 4
Out-of-State Public 4-Year College or University; Difference-in-Difference Models, Selected Subgroups
White Black Public Private
Race Type of High School Attended
Determinants of Whether Students' SAT Scores Sent to at Least OneMD/VA Any MD/VA Any MD/VA Any MD/VA Any
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Constant 0.426 0.415 0.250 0.412 0.327 0.331 0.224 0.665
(0.027) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.041) (0.053)
DC*Change 1994-95 -0.041 0.028 -0.007 -0.010 -0.025 -0.002 -0.012 -0.011
(0.037) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.033) (0.036)
DC*Change 1995-96 -0.021 -0.008 -0.015 -0.040 0.001 -0.011 -0.027 -0.055
(0.039) (0.032) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.033) (0.036)
DC*Change 1996-97 0.046 -0.026 -0.008 0.027 0.024 0.014 -0.018 0.030
(0.038) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.032) (0.036)
DC*Change 1997-98 0.010 0.022 0.048 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.059 -0.019
(0.037) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.033) (0.036)
DC*Change 1998-99 0.017 0.017 -0.055 -0.026 -0.038 -0.027 -0.029 0.017
(0.037) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.034) (0.037)
DC*Change 1999-2000 0.037 0.001 0.114 0.088 0.110 0.072 0.070 0.051
(0.035) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.034) (0.037)
DC*Change 2000-2001 0.044 0.044 0.062 0.061 0.028 0.024 0.101 0.115
(0.032) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.035) (0.035)
Year change dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 21,009 21,009 41,406 41,406 47,603 47,603 14,812 14,812
R-squared 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.07 0.08
Source:  SAT Score Database.  
Notes:  All models weighted OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
High School or Less Some College or More LE 1000 GT 1000
Out-of-State Public 4-Year College or University; Difference-in-Difference Models, Selected Subgroups
Table 4 (continued)
Determinants of Whether Students' SAT Scores Sent to at Least One
Highest Parental Educational Attainment SAT V+M ScoreMD or VA Any elig. Any 4-year MD or VA Any elig.
elig. school school school elig. school school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.613 1.248 1.691 0.144 0.286
(0.030) (0.053) (0.100) (0.006) (0.009)
DC*Change 1994-95 -0.069 -0.074 -0.033 -0.013 0.000
(0.038) (0.066) (0.112) (0.008) (0.011)
DC*Change 1995-96 0.016 0.017 0.194 0.002 -0.011
(0.039) (0.068) (0.113) (0.008) (0.011)
DC*Change 1996-97 0.031 -0.020 -0.092 0.013 0.016
(0.040) (0.069) (0.113) (0.008) (0.011)
DC*Change 1997-98 0.071 0.140 0.032 0.001 0.003
(0.040) (0.069) (0.114) (0.008) (0.011)
DC*Change 1998-99 -0.100 -0.162 0.072 -0.017 -0.032
(0.040) (0.071) (0.119) (0.008) (0.011)
DC*Change 1999-2000 0.285 0.331 -0.014 0.048 0.068
(0.043) (0.070) (0.119) (0.008) (0.011)
DC*Change 2000-2001 0.121 0.307 0.261 0.022 0.040
(0.046) (0.072) (0.118) (0.008) (0.011)
Year change dummies yes yes yes yes yes
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic covariates yes yes yes yes yes
 
Observations 62,415 62,415 62,415 62,415 62,415
R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.18
Source:  SAT Score Database.  
Notes:  All models weighted OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity-consistent 
     standard errors.
Frac. of scores sent to Number of scores sent to
Determinants of Number and Share of Scores Sent 
Table 5
to DCTAG-Eligible Schools2- or 4- DCTAG State of
School name Fall '96 Fall '98 Fall '00 1996-98 98-2000 year eligible? school
1 Virginia State University  19 16 108 -3 92 4 yes VA
2 Norfolk State University  22 12 60 -10 48 4 yes VA
3 Virginia Commonwealth University  4 2 22 -2 20 4 yes VA
4 Montgomery College of Rockville  11 9 27 -2 18 2 yes MD
5 Prince Georges Community College  14 16 34 2 18 2 yes MD
6 Morgan State University  13 14 29 1 15 4 yes MD
7 George Mason University  12 3 16 -9 13 4 yes VA
8 Johnson C Smith University  13 14 27 1 13 4 NC
9 University of Maryland College Park 11 13 25 2 12 4 yes MD
10 University of Maryland Eastern Shore  25 18 29 -7 11 4 yes MD
11 Saint Paul's College  9 5 15 -4 10 4 VA
12 Columbia University 17 16 25 -1 9 4 NY
13 Old Dominion University  1 1 10 0 9 4 yes VA
14 University of Colorado at Boulder  3 3 12 0 9 4 yes CO




(Continued on next page.)
Table 6
Fall Enrollment of DC Freshmen Completing High School in Last 12 Months, by School
Number of frosh from DC Change, DC frosh2- or 4- DCTAG State of




2897 University of Georgia  1 6 0 5 -6 4 yes GA
2898 Vassar College  5 6 0 1 -6 4 NY
2899 Waynesburg College  3 8 1 5 -7 4 PA
2900 Bennett College  11 12 4 1 -8 4 NC
2901 Georgetown University  10 13 5 3 -8 4 DC
2902 Florida A&M University  9 18 9 9 -9 4 yes FL
2903 Strayer College-Washington Campus  34 31 22 -3 -9 4 DC
2904 Cheyney University of Pennsylvania  3 14 2 11 -12 4 yes PA
2905 Clark Atlanta University  19 21 9 2 -12 4 GA
2906 Delaware State University  22 38 25 16 -13 4 yes DE
2907 Hampton University  10 34 21 24 -13 4 VA
2908 North Carolina Wesleyan College  6 23 8 17 -15 4 NC
2909 University of the District of Columbia  287 260 245 -27 -15 4 DC
2910 George Washington University  86 60 23 -26 -37 4 DC
2911 Howard University  123 86 29 -37 -57 4 DC
Total: MD and VA DCTAG-eligible schools 188 178 470 -10 292 yes
Total: All DCTAG-eligible schools 436 487 718 51 231 yes
Total: All schools 1,870 1,775 1,893 -95 118
Source:  Integrated Postsecondary Data System, 1996-2000.  
Notes:  Two- and four-year schools reporting freshman enrollment by state of residence in 1996, 1998, and 2000 were included in the 
     tabulation.  This set includes 66 MD and VA DCTAG-eligible schools, 1,414 eligible institutions in other states, and 1,431
     ineligible schools.
Table 6 (continued)
Fall Enrollment of DC Freshmen Completing High School in Last 12 Months, by School
Number of frosh from DC Change, DC froshIn-state Out-of-state DCTAG State  of
School name Tuition Tuition Difference eligible? school
1 Virginia State University  3,439 8,284 4,845 yes VA
2 Norfolk State University  3,335 7,540 4,205 yes VA
3 Virginia Commonwealth University  4,182 12,666 8,484 yes VA
4 Montgomery College of Rockville  5,070 6,762 1,692 yes MD
5 Prince Georges Community College  4,660 7,090 2,430 yes MD
6 Morgan State University  3,706 8,810 5,104 yes MD
7 George Mason University  4,344 12,504 8,160 yes VA
8 Johnson C Smith University  8,959 8,959 0 NC
9 University of Maryland College Park 4,699 11,221 6,522 yes MD
10 University of Maryland Eastern Shore  3,585 8,227 4,642 yes MD
11 Saint Paul's College  9,780 9,780 0 VA
12 Columbia University 23,244 23,244 0 NY
13 Old Dominion University  3,476 8,900 5,424 yes VA
14 University of Colorado at Boulder  3,038 15,520 12,482 yes CO
15 University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus  6,424 13,458 7,034 yes PA . . .
(Continued on next page.)
Table 7
1998 Tuition of Schools with Largest Changes in Freshmen Enrollment of DC ResidentsIn-state Out-of-state DCTAG State  of
School name Tuition Tuition Difference eligible? school . . .
2897 University of Georgia  2,930 9,860 6,930 yes GA
2898 Vassar College  23,000 23,000 0 NY
2899 Waynesburg College  10,970 10,970 0 PA
2900 Bennett College  7,905 7,905 0 NC
2901 Georgetown University  22,446 22,446 0 DC
2902 Florida A&M University  2,133 8,788 6,655 yes FL
2903 Strayer College-Washington Campus  7,695 7,695 0 DC
2904 Cheyney University of Pennsylvania  4,023 9,379 5,356 yes PA
2905 Clark Atlanta University  9,650 9,650 0 GA
2906 Delaware State University  2,974 8,104 5,130 yes DE
2907 Hampton University  10,076 10,076 0 VA
2908 North Carolina Wesleyan College  8,144 8,144 0 NC
2909 University of the District of Columbia  2,010 4,650 2,640 DC
2910 George Washington University  22,625 22,625 0 DC
2911 Howard University  9,155 9,155 0 DC
Average: MD and VA DCTAG-eligible schools 3,095 6,969 3,874 yes
Average: All DCTAG-eligible schools 2,294 5,739 3,445 yes
Average: All schools 6,640 8,405 1,765
Source:  Integrated Postsecondary Data System, 1996-2000. 
Notes:  Two- and four-year schools reporting freshman enrollment by state of residence in 1996, 1998, and 2000 were
     included in the tabulation.  This set includes 66 Maryland and Virginia DCTAG-eligible schools, 1,414 eligible
     institutions in other states, and 1,431 ineligible schools.
Table 7 (continued)
1998 Tuition of Schools with Largest Changes in Freshmen Enrollment of DC Residents